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 2 
Introduction 
 
The objective of this article is to describe the Portuguese National Healthcare Service, 
giving a special emphasis to the recent reforms that have been introduced since the 
beginning of 2002. Its main argument is that there are two different (but connected) 
rationales that underpin the orientation of the current reforms. One the one hand, the 
explicit rationale that refers mainly to the ‘visible’ and stated causes and motivations 
of the reforms. On the other hand, the implicit rationale, whose influence over the 
government’s actions is not expressed as such, either because it is not perceived, or 
because it is not assumed. 
For this purpose, it is essential to start by giving an historical account of how the NHS 
started in Portugal and in which direction it has been evolving in the last four decades. 
This section has particular interest considering that it gives meaning, together with 
other arguments, to the implicit rationale, to the extent that the current reforms are 
product of the historical context in which the NHS was created and its subsequent 
developments. 
In the second part, the focus is on the reformation period, that started in 2002 and that 
is still going on at the moment. The main reforms that are being conducted are 
analysed, being this section mainly of a descriptive nature. What is considered to be 
important in this section is to give the government’s account of the reforms, in order 
to make clear what are its motivations and its goals. Furthermore, by doing this 
analysis it makes it possible to put forward what is meant by explicit rationale and 
identify its features. 
In section three, the reforms described in section two are analysed individually in a 
critical way. The objective of this section is to ‘make sense’ of the reforms being 
undertaken by the government and consider some aspects that are still unclear and 
that need further reflection. It is throughout this section that the main argument of this 
article is explored, by discussing, when applicable, what is the rationale underpinning 
the different reforms. 
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In the conclusion, it is resumed what is the importance of the approached followed in 
this article and to what extent it can be useful to understand the Portuguese NHS and 
its future development. 
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1. Historical background 
1.1. The origins and evolution of the NHS in Portugal 
The Portuguese Health Care System was created in 1979 and is based on the classical 
National Health Service model. This model is characterised by universal coverage of 
the population, generality of benefits, national tax financing and national ownership 
or control of factors of production (OECD, 1987a). 
Before the creation of the National Health Service and to be more precise, before the 
Revolution of April 1974, the government played a secondary role in the provision of 
health care, filling gaps left by the private initiative and giving priority to preventive 
services. Apart from the preventive care expenses (the more specialised curative 
services such as maternal and child health, certain infectious diseases and mental 
health) and the civil servants care expenses, the responsibility to pay for health care 
was left to the individual patient and his or her family (see Table 1.). 
Table 1. Percentage of the population covered by a health insurance 
 1960 1965 1970 1971-1975 
Coverage rate 18% 32% 40% 58% 
Source: OECD, Health data 2003 
 
The public expenditure on health was in 1970, 9.92% of the total public expenditure 
and 1.86% of the GDP, a very low share of gross domestic product if compared to 
most OECD countries (OECD, 2003b). In fact, most part of the health care services 
were provided by religious charity hospitals (“misericórdias”), social welfare medical 
units, health posts or private entities (see Table 2.). 
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Table 2. Health Institutions in Portugal in 1970 
Gener. Special. Total
With hospitalisation 480 154 634
Government 87 84 171
Misericórdias 273 11 284
Private 116 44 160
For profit             -             -             - 
Non profit             -             -             - 
Other Entities 4 15 19
Source: Adapted from OECD (1994) 
 
By 1970, the main problems in the health sector were: the low standards of health 
(infant mortality rate of 58% compared to 5% in 2001; 8,580 doctors compared to 
33,233 in 2001; etc); the poor distribution of health units and health professionals, 
with most part of them situated on the urban areas; the lack of co-ordination between 
the multiple providers of health care services, since they had no relationships with 
each other; the multiple sources of financing; and the excessive centralisation of some 
services. 
As an attempt to solve these and other debilities of the health sector, a new law, 
passed in 1971, gave priority to the government over the private sector as a mean to 
secure a more rational allocation of resources, and aimed to give to the whole 
population access to a full range of health services. This law included the 
establishment of the first generation health centres (“Centros de Saúde de 1ª 
Geração”) that embody the preparation of a real National Health Service. 
The democratic revolution of the 25th April 1974 (that marked the end of the 
dictatorial regime) and the new Constitution of 1976 changed Portugal profoundly. 
Soon after the 1974 revolution the hospitals belonging to the “misericórdias” were 
taken over by the government as well as the social welfare medical units and the 
health posts. As far as the district hospitals are concerned, a number of them were 
rebuilt or upgraded. 
New social policies emerged and the creation of a National Health Service was seen 
as the more adequate response to the needs of the population. Under the new 
Constitution, all the citizens were given ‘the right to health’, which was to be 
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provided by a ‘National Health Service which was universal, comprehensive and free 
of charge’. 
In 1979 the National Health Service was indeed created, extending the provision of 
free health care to all citizens, independently of their social or economic condition. 
The National Health Service was to be nearly all financed from taxation. The two 
main providers of health care, social security medical care and the public health 
services, were brought together under the law that defined the principle of unified 
direction and decentralised management. Although the NHS claimed to be universal, 
some insurance schemes were left untouched, principally the civil servants scheme 
that was mainly financed by the government but also by a percentage of the salary of 
the employee (around 1%). This scheme enabled the civil servants, apart from the 
access to the hospital system, to go to private doctors and dentists (paid on a fee-for-
service basis) and use private clinics and hospitals. Similar benefits were extended to 
employees of public enterprises (public transports, ports and communications) as well 
as some special provisions for students, the armed forces, bank workers, etc. So, in 
practice, these groups had some privileges that the general population did not have 
access to, which questions the principle of universality of the NHS and to what extent 
it works in practice. 
In 1980, the public expenditure on health was 13.7% of the total public expenditure, 
which represents an increase of 3.78% in relation to 1970 (OECD, 1994) and the 
public expenditure rose from 59% of total health expenditure in 1970 to 64.3% in 
1980 (OECD, 2003b), as a result of the more intervenient role of the state on the 
public health after 1971. 
The period when the NHS was created in Portugal was characterised by profound 
political, economical and social changes, marked by the beginning of the democracy 
and the decolonisation process. These circumstances made the NHS suffer from a 
series of limitations and weaknesses reflected in: a fragile financial basis and lack of 
appropriate organisational and management models; difficult access and low 
efficiency of the public health services; lack of transparency between public and 
private interests. The limitations associated with the context where the NHS was 
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created, as well as the inability of the political system to deal with them, marked all its 
subsequent development. 
Due to these limitations, in practice it was very difficult to implement some of the 
modifications introduced by the 1979 law. The difficulty in establishing the 
boundaries between the public and private sectors, conducted many Portuguese to use 
simultaneously more than one health subsystem, according to what they perceive to 
be better in a particular situation given the alternatives at their disposal. In general, 
this situation involves opting for private providers, where they usually have to pay 
fees and later are reimbursed partially or fully by the Ministry of Health. So, the state 
is paying for services that could be provided inside the NHS without additional costs.  
Additionally, most part of the doctors worked both in the private and the public 
sectors, which resulted in a deficient dedication to the public sector, where the salaries 
were low compared to those in the private sector. As a result, there was a generalised 
dissatisfaction with the public sector and the perception that a higher health care 
quality was provided by the private sector. In fact, in decade of 1970, as it was 
already mentioned, the total number of doctors was 8,580, from which 5,169 were 
general practitioners and 3,451 were specialists (OECD, 1994). The total population 
was 8,680,000 so the ratio was approximately of 1 doctor per 1,000 population. As the 
number of doctors was so small, they were in a position where they could maximise 
their income by working in the private sector once there was a big demand for their 
services. By that time, the doctors were seen as a very valuable resource and there 
was no way they could be exempted to work in the public service, even if it was 
acknowledged that they were not doing their work with total dedication. For this 
reason, their strategic position in the NHS was a very strong one and that will have 
repercussions on subsequent development. 
In 1982, as an attempt to increase the efficiency of the NHS, the Regional Health 
Administrations (RHAs) were established: 18 districts were created, correspondent to 
the administrative division of the country. The money flows from the Ministry to 
these RHAs that are responsible for implementing the health policy within their 
region. Their main responsibilities are to collect data, inspect and control professional 
activity, plan and evaluate the services and set up the contracts with the agencies 
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outside the NHS. This measure revealed to be inappropriate due to the difficulty of 
the Ministry of Health in coordinating a considerable number of Regional 
Administrations (18), General-Directorates (5) and Institutes (7). Consequently, a new 
law passed in 1993 (Decree Law no. 11/93), established that the 18 Regional Health 
Administrations were to be substituted by 5 Regional Health Administrations, which 
are subdivided into 18 Sub-Regions of Health. 
A new government ruled Portugal from 1985 to 1995 and some of the actions 
undertaken reflected its right wing ideological option. The legislation of 1990 (“Lei 
de Bases da Saúde”) redefined the mission of the NHS towards a broader concept of 
health care systems. This was to be achieved through a bigger incentive in the 
creation of private units of health care services, provided that they were licensed and 
inspected by the government. Furthermore, the private management of health 
institutions was encouraged (especially in the public health centres and public 
hospitals) and the government was willing to facilitate the flow of the human 
resources from the NHS to the private sector. 
It was not before legislation approved in 1993 that some of the measures described 
above took place. One of them, as it was already mentioned, was the establishment of 
5 health regions with maximum autonomy: North, Centre, Lisbon & Tagus Valley, 
Alentejo and Algarve. These Regional Health Administrations are responsible for the 
local implementation of national health policy objectives, allowing both a better 
allocation of resources and a better co-ordination between the different health units. 
Another important issue was related with the possibility of the doctors that work in 
the public service in a full time basis, to have professional activity in the private 
sector as far as this does not interfere with their NHS responsibilities. 
In 1995, a socialist government came to power and with it, a new reform of the health 
care system. In fact, the NHS reformation process was most part of the times related 
with new political cycles, regarding that the health sector has being seen by the 
politicians as a priority. In this context, the new reform was based on the principles of 
what was called “new public management”, characterised by the following aspects: 
first, transformation of the management models of the public hospitals and health 
centres towards a more flexible and autonomous model of management, characteristic 
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of the private companies (it was decided in 1996 that all the hospitals should follow 
this model). Second, expansion of the quality systems with the creation of the 
“Institute of the Quality in Health”. Third, creation of two new medicine schools and 
reinforcement of the research centres in health sciences as an attempt to increase the 
quality of the human resources. Fourth, establishment of “contract agencies”, an 
autonomous part of the Regional Health Administrations, which role is to make the 
contracts with hospitals, health centres and independent groups of doctors, in a first 
attempt to promote the separation between providers and purchasers, as well as to 
increase the citizen participation in health decision-making. And fifth, implementation 
of programs to reduce the waiting lists for surgeries and the creation of the user’s card 
(“cartão do utente”) - an identification card containing the patient’s name, address, 
date of birth, and other data, that should be presented every time the patient uses any 
NHS service. 
Another important aspect was that, since 1997, the retrospective hospital budget, 
based on historical data, was substituted by a prospective budget, based on elements 
related to production costs, i.e., budgets are based on predicted costs rather than an 
historical budget (1999 was the first year of budget negotiations based on contracts). 
There were as well some initiatives concerning the pharmaceutical policy (especially 
after 1998), mainly: the incentive to the prescription of generics, the low price of the 
generic drugs (35% less than the other similar drugs), the promotional actions 
informing the consumers about the economical advantages of buying generics, the 
incentive given to the national pharmaceutical industry to produce them, etc. 
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2. Reformation Period 
2.1. From 2002 onwards  
 
After the elections of 2002 a new political cycle was initiated with the change of 
government. This year was characterised by high uncertainty about the international 
economical evolution, after a phase of general growth. In Portugal, after a period of 
strong economical expansion in the second half of the 1990s, the GDP increased only 
0.4% in 2002 compared to 2001 (OECD, 2003a). At the same time, new pressures for 
change emerged as the public debt substantially exceeded the 3% ceiling allowed by 
the EU Stability Pact (Observatório Português dos Sistemas de Saúde, 2003). 
The state is currently under pressure to cut public spending and to implement 
structural reforms. Health, education and social affairs, accounted for more than 60% 
of general government expenditure in 2001 and the public expenditure on health (as a 
percentage of GDP) was 6.3%, which is slightly below the OECD averagea (6.5%) but 
above the Euro Area average (6.0%) (OECD, 2003b). Moreover, traditionally the 
Portuguese NHS performs poorly in terms of efficiency, accountability and cost 
containment. In 2001, the OECD Economic Survey of Portugal highlighted the main 
problems of the public health system and sources of spending pressure. According to 
this report, there are different factors contributing to it: overlapping insurance 
schemes, lack of management flexibility and accountability, inadequate co-ordination 
between public health institutions, an inefficient system of doctors’ remuneration, and 
insufficient competition in health provision and in the sale of pharmaceutical products 
(OECD, 2001b). 
Facing this scenario, the government defined a ‘New National Health Care System’ to 
be implemented during the period 2002-2006 (Governo da República Portuguesa, 
2002) as an attempt to improve these deficiencies. The reforms will direct the NHS 
into a “mix of health services, where public, private and social entities coexist and act 
in an integrated manner, directed towards the needs of health care users” (Ministry of 
 
a. Due to lack of data availability, Korea, Luxembourg and Turkey are excluded from OECD average. 
Luxembourg is also excluded from the Euro Area average. 
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Finance, 2003). In this way, the patients will be able to choose the more appropriate 
services to fulfil their particular needs and that will, according to the government, 
improve the provision of qualitative attendance to the citizens with effectiveness and 
humanism. 
As main changing tools, the government proposes: i. the development of partnerships 
with the private sectors, the so called public/private partnerships (PPP); ii. the end of 
the waiting lists in surgeries and consultations; iii. to provide each citizen with a 
family doctor; iv. the transformation of public hospitals into companies; v. the 
adoption of alternative management models, specifically more entrepreneur models 
(“novas soluções de gestão”); vi. the development of the continuous care network; vii. 
the creation of a new entity to regulate/control the new changes introduced with the 
participation of the private and social players in the provision of public health services 
(called “entidade reguladora da saúde”); viii. improvement of the information systems 
network and creation of a ‘call centre’; ix. modifications on the pharmaceutical policy 
(specially the drugs’ policy); x. changes in the human resource policy; xi. re-
organisation of the emergency services. 
The task that the Portuguese government is undertaking is an enormous one. At this 
stage, not all the previously mentioned actions have already been initiated, some 
because the implementation strategies have not yet been finalised, some other because 
they involve the production of new regulations that need, first, the approval of the 
parliament and then the agreement of the President, which is a relatively long process. 
Not all the forthcoming implementations described above will be analysed next. 
Instead, it was decided to describe in more detail the ones considered to be more 
relevant, in the sense that they involve bigger changes and can create more ‘visible’ 
consequences for the future of the NHS. 
 
Public/Private Partnerships (PPP) 
The Public Private Partnerships (PPP) are seen as a privileged tool for the renewal of 
the NHS and to obtain further gains in terms of efficiency, because they are based 
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upon the transference of risks to the private performers and the transference of the 
effectiveness of the private sector into the public sector. The PPP were established 
through the Decree-Law no. 185/2002, August the 20th, and it is the intention of the 
government to launch ten hospitals (two new hospitals and 8 substitutions) that will 
enter gradually into operation as from the end of 2007. 
The two main advantages identified by the government in respect to the PPP are that 
they assure gains to the user of the NHS, as well as to the public finance. In practice, 
on the users side, there would be more satisfaction because they see their capacity of 
choice of a health care provider increased; on the government side, they transfer the 
risk of investment to the private sector, as well as they benefit from the experienced 
management models and tools of the private sector that being under the market 
pressure will have more motivation to be efficient.  
In summary, the government considers the PPP to be a form of improving the 
financial situation of the NHS (or at least not to complicate it more), while assuring 
the provision of quality health care to the citizens in an equitable way. So far, none of 
the PPP initiatives planned by the government has already started. Furthermore, the 
government has not yet produced the regulation about the specific characteristics of 
the public/private partnership contracts. Nevertheless, there is already an experience 
in Portugal of PPP in the health sector. That concerns the management contract made 
between the Ministry of Health and the Hospital Fernando da Fonseca, which should 
be studied and systematised in order to learn some lessons for the future. This 
particular case shows that the initial contract was not clear and objective enough, so 
there are some deviances that do not benefit the desired transparency of the 
partnership. Furthermore, the monitoring and control mechanisms that should be 
enforced by the state are also insufficient, which creates some suspicions about the 
quality of the services and the way the hospital is being managed. 
However, according to the National Institute of Administration (INA), the Hospital 
Fernando Fonseca is a lucrative hospital, mainly because it has a more efficient 
management of the human resources, since it provides the same services as others but 
using fewer personnel. The superficiality of the studies made about this particular 
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experience of PPP does not allow us to undertake definitive conclusions about its 
efficiency. 
 
Waiting lists 
One of the priorities of the government for enacting the reform of the NHS is to 
increase the access of all citizens to health care. One of the bigger problems identified 
in this respect are the waiting lists in surgeries and consultations. Long waiting lists 
have always been a problem and, as that until now an effective way to deal with them 
was not found, the number of people waiting have been increasing more and more 
across the years as a result of the bad organisation of the services and the low 
productivity of the professionals of the NHS, amongst other reasons. 
The programme that was initiated in 1998, aimed an increased access to health care 
services. In April 2002, the government decided to restructure that programme and set 
a more ambitious objective, in what was called the Special Programme for Combating 
the Waiting Lists (PECLEC). The main objective was to finish all the waiting lists 
until September 2005 and the means to accomplish it are: i. to establish a form of 
attendance for patients in a ‘first in first out’ model, excluding the urgent cases that 
would have priority; ii. to promote the utilisation of the private and social services; 
and iii. to increase the organisation of the services in order to optimise the  patients 
attendance. 
The PECLEC was initiated in June 2002 and by then, according to the Ministry of 
Health, there were 123,126 patients waiting for a surgery. From the 1st July 2002 to 
the 15th August 2003, 7,500 new patients were added to the waiting list per month and 
6,700 surgeries were performed per month. If we consider these results, we can see 
that, in fact, the waiting list for a surgery has been increasing, with the total number of 
patients being 154,726 in 15th August 2003, compared to the 123,126 in June 2002. 
The reason presented by the government to explain this fact is that the number of 
consultations in the new hospital companies increased by 200,000. Thus a higher 
number of patients got a diagnose to their condition. 
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The first target set by the government was to end with the initial waiting list of 
123,126 cases by the end of February 2004; and from March 2004 on, all the surgeries 
are to be made in the “clinically accepted length of time” (this depends on the type of 
surgery). On the 10th December 2003, in an intervention in the Parliament, the 
Minister of Health announced that from March 2004 on, if a patient is waiting for a 
surgery more than the “clinically accepted length of time”, he or she has the right to 
request a ‘voucher’ and to use it in any public, private or social provider of health 
care, inasmuch as that entity has an agreement with the state. This will transfer the 
decision of doing a surgery to the patient. 
The reason why it is considered important to shift the decision to make a surgery to 
the patient is because, according to the Ministry of Health, 20,000 patients refused 
surgeries in the private sector since the beginning of the PECLEC (LUSA, 2004). So, 
this measure implies that 20,000 patients will be taken out of the waiting list. There 
are two different perspectives to interpret this action: the first is that it aims solely at 
the reduction of the number of people in the waiting lists, for political reasons. The 
second is that, there is the possibility that some of the people in the waiting lists might 
have already done a surgery in the private or social sectors without informing the 
NHS, and that may cause disruption in the services. 
Not before March 2004 (first target established by the government) the result of the 
PECLEC will be assessed and to what extent there will be less people on the waiting 
lists. It is as well relevant to note that in the law approved in the parliament in 1999 
about waiting lists (Law no. 27/99, 3 May 1999), it was stated that every 2 months a 
report should be presented regarding the current situation of the waiting lists. 
Nevertheless, there is no record of any report being presented in the last year and that 
did not raise any worry in the different political actors. 
 
Hospital Management Reform 
Traditionally, Portuguese public hospitals perform poorly in terms of efficiency, 
accountability and cost containment. An evidence for this is that historically, the 
actual health expenditures usually exceed considerably the budget limits, requiring the 
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approval of additional budgets (Dixon and Mossialos, 2000). According to Monica 
Oliveira (2002) some reasons for this are: first, doctors have little incentive to be 
productive in public hospitals - as their payment system is based on salaries, 
productivity is not rewarded and doctors maximise income by doing overtime in NHS 
hospitals and working in the private sector; second, hospital administrators are not 
encouraged to operate within budgets, because they are not penalised for overruns; 
third, hospital administrators have little decision-making autonomy as far as the 
control of investment and human resources is concerned. 
Despite protests from key stakeholders, a new hospital management law was passed 
through Parliament in September 2002 (Law no. 27/2002). The new law follows 
similar trends in other countries, by moving NHS hospital management structures 
away from a single-category of public status, to one where public entities coexist with 
private entities acting in a cooperative way and having as common objective the 
fulfilment of the patients’ needs. These reforms have significant implications for the 
future of hospitals in Portugal. 
The new hospital management law required the amendment of the 1990 NHS Law 
and targets two objectives: improving efficiency and accountability and avoiding 
potential withdrawal of services resulting from any potential lack of financial 
resources. The main alterations introduced by the law are: 
1. A change from the collective negotiation of health professionals’ contracts 
to individual labour contracts. 
2. Changing the concept of the ‘NHS hospital’ to the new concept of 
‘Network of health care providers’, which includes four types of hospitals 
(Observatório Português dos Sistemas de Saúde, 2003): 
a) Public providers with financial and administrative autonomy but under 
public management; 
b) Public providers with administrative, financial and asset management 
autonomy, under (contracted) private management; 
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c) Providers under corporate law, with equity shares and the State as the 
exclusive shareholder. The state owns their capital via numerous public 
agencies that act as statutory shareholders (called ‘hospital 
companies’). 
d) Private providers contracted by the State. 
3. Other changes such us the introduction of performance evaluation, funding 
by activity related payments and establishing freedom of choice of 
provider for patients. 
According to the Portuguese Department of Health, the objective of these reforms is 
performing a shift from a bureaucratic and monopolistic health care system to a 
system that is strongly orientated towards the satisfaction of the patient/customer 
needs and characterised by the existence of multiple providers. 
 
 ‘Hospital Companies’ 
Among the 4 possible types of hospitals presented under the new law, the ‘Hospital 
Company’ was the option preferred by the government, even if it is the most 
autonomous of them all. In the beginning of 2003, a new enterprising model was 
implemented, transforming 34 public hospitals (about 1/3 of the total number of 
public hospitals) into 31 anonymous societies (‘hospital companies’) exclusively with 
public capital and a management board constituted by public managers (Ministry of 
Health, 2003). 
The aim of this alteration is to simulate a market for the hospitals so that the NHS 
might be free to purchase services both in the public and in the private sector. 
Simultaneously, the Department of Health promotes the functional separation between 
the purchaser and the provider of health care, arguing that such separation will better 
assure the provision of care, based on the premise that an increase in competition will 
lead to better quality of services. 
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Ideally, the transformation into corporate entities should enhance accountability and 
efficiency. A few pilot programmes where either public hospitals have incorporated 
private practices in cost management, or hospitals are privately run, show that costs 
can be reduced. Two examples are those of Hospital Nossa Senhora do Rosário and 
Hospital de São Sebatião. In the first case, it was possible to obtain efficiency gains 
by making each director fully responsible for the management of his service 
(introduction of middle management). An activity based-costing (ABC) was 
established to each service, so that comparisons can be made, benchmarks established 
and inefficiencies identified. Another objective of the strategy implemented in 
Hospital Nossa Senhora do Rosário was to break up the resistance of doctors and 
nurses to changes in their traditional working environment. 
In Hospital de São Sebastião, the introduction of individual labour contracts allowed 
the hospital to reduce the costs with the professionals that, by their own initiative, 
chose to have an individual labour contract based on individual performance (around 
80% of the total professionals in 2000). This gave more flexibility to the managers in 
terms of organisation of the services and kept personnel spending below the average 
of other public hospitals of the same size in the region (Ministério da Saúde, 2003). 
People with responsibilities in the health sector, the academic community and the 
public feel that although it was necessary to change the status quo, the option of the 
government in adopting an enterprising model in such a large number of hospitals is 
neither sufficiently supported by in-depth studies of the Portuguese health sector nor 
based on evidence of successful experiences performed in other countries 
(Observatório Português dos Sistemas de Saúde, 2003). 
The government has a different opinion and the Minister of Health, in an interview 
given on 10th December 2003 (Costa and Costa, 2003), announced that, comparing the 
first 9 months of 2002 with the first 9 months of 2003, the hospital companies 
increased the number of surgeries by 20%, the number of consultations by 9%, the 
day care treatments by 15% and all these using less resources than before. 
Now the hospitals seem to put more effort in containing costs because they have 
activity plans based on multi-annual contract programmes, agreed upon with the 
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Ministry of Health. These contracts introduce qualitative and quantitative targets, 
scheduling, investment needs as well as performance indicators. They also involved 
the monitoring of quality and they refer only to the provision of health care to the 
NHS, thus not including the provision of services to other health subsystems or health 
insurances. The payments that the Ministry of Health does to the hospitals for the 
services provided, are based upon contracted production levels with an upper margin 
of 10%; payments above this margin are based on the marginal costs. The hospitals 
have an extra incentive to contain expenses, once the overruns that were covered by 
adjustments to the initial budget in the past, will no longer be. Apart from the 
contracts with the state, they need to attract new patients/customers, whether they are 
individual patients or other purchasers of health such as health subsystems, health 
insurances or other agents. In summary, the hospital companies, similarly to any other 
player in a market, need to be competitive, based on elements such as: efficiency, 
quality and price, amongst others. 
 
Modification of the Pharmaceutical Policy 
In the last years, the pharmaceutical policy in Portugal has been oriented by a strong 
attempt to control the continuous growth of the expenses in the sector. It is consensual 
that it is urgent to stop the expansion of the costs that the government has with 
medicines, which is an area of recognised waste of resources. In 1997/1998, 25.8% of 
Portugal’s total health expenditure was on pharmaceuticals, which is the highest 
percentage between countries of the EU (see Graph 1). Since 1998 this sector was 
object of some renewals, but it was mainly after 2002 that more specific actions were 
undertaken in order to improve the accountability of the pharmaceutical sector.  
Graph 1. Expenditure on pharmaceuticals as a share of total health expenditure in the 
EU countries, 1997/98 
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Source: Adapted from OECD (2001a) 
* Due to lack of data availability Austria is not included 
 
Several campaigns were carried out in order to call the attention of the public to the 
economic benefits in buying generics, regarding that they are cheaper than the other 
medicines and have the same quality. Other measures carried out include: the pricing 
of generics at least 35% below the price of the reference product; the subsidisation of 
generics by the state, 10% more than the other “traditional” medicines; the 
prescription of medicines needs to be done by Common International Denomination; 
the introduction of the price referral system (PRS) with cost-sharing based on the 
price of the most expensive generic; the support to the pharmaceutical industry for 
R&D activities and technological development; the adoption of a new medical 
prescription model, with the inclusion of the modality of renewal medical 
prescription; and the development of an information system. 
This reforms lead to a significant increase in the use of generics, whose market share 
rose from 1.27% in the first semester of 2002, to 6.2% in the same period of 2003 
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(Ministry of Finance, 2003). In terms of sales, the value of generics sold in 2003 was, 
111 million euros, three times more than the 33 million euros sold in 2002. 
As a consequence of the increase of the generics’ market in Portugal, the public 
expense with medicines has already decreased, regarding that the amount that the 
state pays to the pharmacies to cover the subsidies decreased as well. The Ministry of 
Health underlines that the savings are going to be bigger than initially forecasted, not 
including the savings of the families that, now, buy generics. Apart from these more 
direct effects, the introduction of generics into the market has other consequences, 
related to the need of the laboratories to decrease the price of the medicines they sell, 
if they want to remain competitive. 
In general terms, the introduction of generics into the pharmaceutical market, more 
than contributing to the reduction of the expenses of the public sector with medicines, 
has an essential role in the design of a policy that aims the rational use of medicines 
by the citizens. Portugal was in 1998 one of the countries with higher expenditure on 
pharmaceuticals per capita (US$ PPP) with $310, only surpassed by Belgium ($318) 
and France ($447) amongst all the EU countries (OECD, 2001a). 
 
Changes in Human Resource Policy 
Huan resource policy was identified by the government as one of the areas of 
inefficiency in health care. The remuneration system for physicians is considered to 
be one of the causes of the spending pressures, regarding that doctor’s remuneration is 
linked to professional category and length of service, irrespective of productivity. The 
deficit of health professionals and the asymmetry in their regional distribution is 
another problem identified by the government. The concentration of doctors and 
nursing personnel in the coastland health facilities namely in Oporto, Lisbon and 
Coimbra, led to problems of scarcity of these professionals in the suburbs.  
To address these and other issues, the government intends to implement different 
measures. One is the development of an integrated information system that would 
enable a continuous update of the characteristics and distribution of the personnel, in 
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an attempt to promote a better allocation of resources. Another measure is to engage 
in a partnership with the Ministry of Education in order to propose measures for the 
resolution of health lacks on a short medium basis, mainly by increasing the number 
of students that each year go into the Universities to do a course in medical sciences. 
In fact, according to data from 1995, Portugal was the EU country with the lowest 
ratio of health care personnel (physicians and nurses) entering the workforce, per 
100,000 population (Dixon and Reis, 1999). 
It is also urgent that the areas where there is need for a specific type of professionals 
are identified, and subsequently find solutions more adjustable to the real needs of 
each region. This could be achieved, according to the government, through the 
approval of a project, which contemplates incentives to the doctors working in 
services or areas that suffer from shortages.  
A final proposal of the government is to develop new models of remuneration based 
on the performance. This issue is related with the new judicial regime of hospital 
management approved by Law no. 27/2002 and the subsequent transformation of 
public hospitals into hospital companies. This change involves the possibility of the 
personnel in opting for individual contracts based on productivity and efficiency. The 
government sees here a possibility of reducing the costs with salaries that account 
typically for 80% of hospitals’ current outlays (Bronchi, 2003). This measure would 
also be a disincentive for doctors to divide their working hours between the public and 
the private sector, once their remuneration in the public sector is no longer a “fixed” 
salary. 
 
The main reforms initiated in 2002, when the current government started its 
governance, have been described. As it was mentioned, the political motivation of the 
government was essentially financial, to the extent that Portugal was under pressure to 
reduce its public debt in order to accomplish with the Stability Pact. 
Now that the criteria in which the Ministry of Health and the Government based their 
decisions when introducing the reforms were presented, it is important to assess what 
are the possible drawbacks or benefits that may arise, as well as integrate the 
 22 
described reforms in the rationales introduced in the beginning of this article: the 
implicit rationale and the explicit rationale. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind 
that some reforms have not yet been initiated and some others are so recent that major 
conclusions cannot yet be drawn. 
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3. Discussion 
 
It is undeniable that the Portuguese NHS needs some intervention in order to become 
not only better in terms of accountability and cost containment but also in terms of the 
reorganisation of its practices. Some issues that seem to be unclear deserve further 
reflection and that is what this section aims at. 
In order to make it clearer to the reader, the structure to be followed will be the same 
as that of the previous section, where the main aspects of the reforms will be analysed 
one by one, discussing possible links between them. 
But before this, a short reflection on the concepts of implicit and explicit rationale 
will be made, once they will be used throughout the section, every time it is 
considered to be relevant. 
 
3.1. Implicit Rationale and Explicit Rationale 
It is important at this point that the concepts defined in this paper as implicit and 
explicit rationale are introduced, in order to contextualise the ongoing reforms. If the 
motivations of the reforms are identified and if they are understood in the broad 
framework of the Portuguese NHS since its origin to the present, it is more likely that 
more meaningful reflections about the future developments of the NHS can be made. 
3.1.1. Implicit Rationale 
The implicit rationale concerns mainly what was described in the section 1 of this 
paper. The history of the NHS, starting with the circumstances in which it was 
created, the way it evolved, until the moment the current government decided to 
implement these reforms, has a very important role to play in the decisions that were 
made. 
There are three main elements that are identified as making part of the implicit 
rationale. The first one is the conjunctural situation in which the NHS was created. As 
it was already referred, the NHS started in a pos-Revolution period, where the country 
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moved from several years under a dictatorial regime to a democracy. The years after 
the 1974 revolution were marked by euphoria and some instability and so the 
circumstances in which the NHS was created made it suffer from several limitations 
(as described in section 1), mainly the lack of appropriate organisational models, a 
fragile financial basis and lack of transparency between public and private interests. 
The second element, closely related to the first, is the political ideology of the 
different governments that have been determining the evolution of the NHS. As it was 
mentioned in section 1, it is evident that depending on the political ideology of the 
government, the practices change and the instruments used to interfere with the way 
the NHS is being run change in the same way. 
The third and last of the elements here identified as making part of the implicit 
rationale is the ‘institutional power’ that doctors have. Since the creation of the NHS 
that doctors have a rather powerful position not only within the organisations where 
they work, but also as an organised professional group with a very active political 
intervention. It is complex to find a single explanation about when this position 
started or how is it maintained. Nevertheless, and for the purpose of this article, there 
is one important point that needs to be made and that is related with the fact that most 
part of the doctors that entered the NHS when it began in 1979 are still part of it now. 
Considering the importance they were given in a time where they were a very 
valuable and scarce resource, it is difficult for them now to foresee the possibility of 
having a ‘downgrade’ in their status; not in terms of professional career but in terms 
of changes in some managerial practices that can have consequences in their 
privileges. For these, and other reasons, the generality of the doctors are considerably 
adverse to change. 
The importance of the implicit rationale is that it influences the decisions made by the 
government and the reforms that were decided to be undertaken, although it is not 
identified as being a motivation of it. To a certain extent, the implicit rationale is a 
tacit element of the reforms. Because it was not announced as such, doesn’t mean that 
it doesn’t play an important role in the way the NHS is now being transformed. It is 
claimed on this paper that the implicit rational does make part of the motivations that 
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are behind the reforms, as it will be discussed in section 3.3 of this article, together 
with the explicit rationale that will be describe next. 
 
3.1.2. Explicit rationale 
Contrary to the implicit rationale, the explicit rationale refers mainly to those 
elements described in section 2, which the government identifies as being the causes 
of the reforms. They have mainly a financial dimension, motivated by the problems 
Portugal had in 2002 to maintain the public debt under the 3% limit allowed by the 
EU stability pact.  
According to the government, improved accountability, cost containment and more 
efficiency are some of the guiding lines of the reorganisation of the NHS to be carried 
out in the next years, always keeping in mind that the ultimate mission of the NHS is 
to provide the citizen with qualitative health care.  
These are, therefore, the elements that compose the explicit rationale; the ones that 
are articulated and assumed by the government as being the motivation of the reforms. 
 
3.2. The Reforms 
Public/Private Partnerships  
It is mainly based on what was identified as explicit rationale that we should place the 
creation of the PPP. The reasons of the government to launch this initiative are mainly 
related to the improvement of the accountability and the financial problems that are 
faced by the majority of the public hospitals. Nevertheless, it also considerable the 
influence of the government’s political orientation in the decision of creating PPP 
opting, not only in the health care sector, to give to the private organisations the 
opportunity to enter markets that have been, until now, mainly dominated by the state 
in order to make these markets more competitive and the organisations that ‘play’ in 
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them more efficient and cost aware. So, also the implicit rationale influences directly 
this initiative. 
Until the present moment none of the 10 PPP announced by the government have 
been initiated. As it was mentioned in the previous section, there is one PPP 
experience in the health sector with Hospital Fernando da Fonseca, which has 
already caused some problems to the government, because the initial contract was not 
clear enough and complete enough to avoid some inaccuracies, especially as far as 
mechanisms of supervision and monitoring are concerned. 
It does not seem that the origins of the above mentioned problems have been 
identified and studied in depth by the government, which would be necessary in order 
to avoid similar problems in the forthcoming experiences. In fact, although the 
European Investment Bank has been emphasising the importance of doing PPP in the 
health sector (as well as in other sectors), the experiences in other countries provide 
little evidence for the benefits of introducing PPP and the debate is controversial. 
In order to make the PPP a success in Portugal by extracting all the positive effects of 
transferring the investment risks from the public sector to the private sector, and the 
effectiveness of the private sector into the public sector, it is fundamental to conduct 
thorough studies adapted to the reality of the Portuguese NHS and not only to import 
solutions adopted in other countries. In addition, it is necessary to define clearly the 
contracts that are going to be made with the different private or social partners to 
avoid potential negative externalities (e.g. financial decontrol, adverse selection). 
 
Waiting Lists 
The government strategy concerning the waiting lists is, I believe, the more ambitious 
of the reforms, together with the transformation of 34 public hospitals into 31 hospital 
companies. 
Both the explicit and implicit rationales are behind this reform. The first, because 
long waiting lists involve very high costs and this situation requires intervention. The 
second, because the present situation is the product of several years of a disorganised 
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system without a clear strategy, which resulted in a big list of people waiting for 
surgeries or consultations – the origin is the conjunctural situation in which the NHS 
was created. 
The commitment made in April 2002 by the Ministry of Health, to finish with the 
initial waiting list by March 2004 (the waiting list that existed when this government 
initiated the reform), and with all the waiting lists by September 2005, was, certainly, 
a very ambitious one and an enormous challenge. Especially if we consider that some 
of the tools to be used in order to achieve this objective were still not put into practice 
or at least not yet fully implemented. For instance the hospital companies, whose 
increased efficiency played a big part on this, as well as the changes in the human 
resource policy. 
In fact, when the hospital companies finally started their activity, the number of 
consultations increased and consequently there were more patients diagnosed to do a 
surgery. As it was mentioned previously, this situation led to an increase in the 
number of patients waiting for a surgery. The Ministry of Health was probably not 
expecting this outcome and the solution found to face it was to announce, last 
December, that from March 2004 on, people waiting for a surgery more than the 
clinically accepted length of time, could go to any private or social provider that has 
an agreement with the state, and do the surgery there. The users of the NHS are not 
satisfied with the services they are being provided and the waiting lists for surgeries 
are probably the main focus of the user’s claims. For this reason, the government is 
really under pressure to make some changes, not only because of the dissatisfaction of 
the patients with the length of time they need to wait for a surgery, but also because 
keeping these patients on a waiting lists for several months involves high costs. 
During the time they are placed on the waiting lists, they keep on having consultations 
and doing exams that are most part of the times very expensive, and all the costs are 
charged to the NHS. 
This situation seems to be, at first sight, very good from the patients’ point of view. 
From March on, they will have the possibility to make the surgery quicker than if they 
were kept in the waiting lists and all this with no additional costs. But in practice, if 
the patients opt for this solution, they will, most likely, need to travel to the place 
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where they are going to be treated, regarding that most part of the private and social 
providers of health care are located in the urban areas of Oporto and Lisbon. There are 
inclusively some contracts made between the Ministry of Health and health care 
providers in Spain, in which case the inconvenience caused to the patients is even 
bigger. 
Although this measure emphasises the principle of universality of the NHS, there 
persist some doubts about how it assures the provision of free health care. 
Furthermore, it is also not clear whether this measure will contribute to the 
containment of costs aimed by the government and increased efficiency of the NHS. 
So far, and after the announcement of this reform, the Ministry of Health did not give 
further explanations about the strategies and tools that support it. It is important that 
the government provides data on the financial benefits of opting for the voucher 
scheme to finish with long waiting lists and to what extent it will not only benefit the 
patient, but also increase the efficiency of the services. 
The main reasons to the definition of the ‘New National Health Care System’ were to 
improve accountability and efficiency of the services, while assuring quality of 
attendance to the patients. The strategy followed by the government, as far as waiting 
lists are concerned, shows some difficulty in co-ordinating these two dimensions: 
efficiency and cost containment on the one side and quality of services on the other. 
This last solution, of introducing a system similar to a ‘voucher scheme’, addresses 
the objective of increasing quality (with some limitations as it was already said), but 
there is no evidence that it will also be positive in terms of efficiency and cost 
containment. Furthermore, this measure appears to be a response to the critics made 
by the civil society and particularly by the political parties with representation in the 
parliament, that the government was only concerned with accountability, cost 
containment, efficiency and measurement, forgetting the foundations of the NHS as 
an universal, comprehensive and free of charge system. If this is the case, the 
motivation appears to be a purely political one, underpinned by electoral motivations. 
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‘Hospital Companies’ 
As it was described earlier, the hospital management reform introduced the following 
main alterations: change from the collective negotiation of health professionals’ 
contracts to individual labour contracts; changing the concept of the ‘NHS hospital’ to 
the new concept of ‘Network of health care providers’ (4 types of hospitals); and 
other changes such as the introduction of performance evaluation, funding by activity 
related payments and establishing freedom of choice of provider for patients. At this 
point, we will only focus on the second alteration, more precisely on the creation of 
hospital companies in the Portuguese NHS because it was the option preferred by the 
government and the one that is generating more discussion. 
With the creation of the hospital companies, the government’s intention is to 
introduce competition into the hospital market as a mean to increase efficiency and 
quality of the services provided and, consequently, the patients’ satisfaction. It aims 
as well, by the separation between purchasers and providers, to have freedom in 
purchasing health care both in the public and in the private sector. Similar experiences 
were already made in other countries (for instance the introduction of quasi-markets 
in the English NHS) and little evidence seems to support this ‘experiment’. Some 
studies conclude that the impact of competition is the reduction of quality in hospitals 
(Propper et al., 2003), which is the opposite effect from the one expected by the 
Portuguese government.  
With the introduction of competition into the hospitals’ market, the Portuguese 
government aims also at cost containment, since the hospitals would need to improve 
its resource allocation in order to attract the customers’ attention and make contracts 
with the purchasers. But it is important to note that the measures to increase resource 
allocation can be themselves costly and sometimes even more costly than the savings 
they create (LeGrand, 1991). Examples might be as distinct as spending on 
advertisement or the need to pay higher wages because hospitals will be competing 
for doctors, nurses, etc. However, wage rises may have a positive effect on the staff’s 
morale and lead to an increase in productivity. It is imperative that these elements are 
taken into consideration by the administrations of the 31 ‘hospital companies’, which 
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are acting under a competitive environment and whose performance is being 
evaluated. 
One of the criticisms that has been made to the creation of the hospital companies is 
that there is the danger that the hospitals start to ‘choose’ the type of patients whose 
treatments involve low-cost procedures and reject those patients who are in conditions 
that require expensive treatments. The name given to this type of behaviour is cream-
skimming, and that is one of the bigger menaces to the principle of equity. The 
government needs to enforce mechanisms of control and supervision in order to avoid 
cream-skimming, and other dangers that can emerge. 
The monitoring and supervision task is a complex one, once there are 31 hospital 
companies already operating. In fact, the number of hospitals involved since the 
beginning in the reforms was possibly too large. If the experience is positive, the 
gains will be big, but if the experience fails, the costs are enormous. Opting for 
different stages in the transformation of public hospitals into hospital companies 
would have been a more cautious strategy. The research group that was created to 
follow the progress of the hospital companies (Unidade de Missão dos Hospitais S.A.) 
could have had more time to study the various changes introduced by the reforms and 
correct possible mistakes in order to make the experience as successful as possible. 
Parallel to this entity, also Entidade Reguladora da Saúde (see section 2) could give 
an useful insight to supervise the hospital companies, although the competences of 
this entity are still not totally defined at the moment. Furthermore, maybe it would be 
easier to make the medical staff accept all the changes involved. In fact, they have 
been contesting this initiative of the government and consider the results, so far made 
public by the Ministry of Health, as false results that aim only confusing the public 
once they give a too optimistic version of the reforms results. 
But, on the other hand, if the number of hospitals would have been smaller, the impact 
of possible gains will also not be big enough to satisfy the government‘s objectives. 
There are some political moments where it is necessary to take ‘big steps’ and this 
was considered to be one of those moments. Some more time is needed in order to 
observe what are the results achieved by the Hospital Companies and to what extent 
they will address some of the problems identified by the government.  
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Up to this point, it was stated that the main reasons for the government to create the 
hospital companies was to increase the efficiency and quality of the services provided, 
while assuring cost containment. So, the explicit rationale underpins this reform and it 
is intention of the government to contain costs by reorganising some practices such 
as: introducing competition into the market, introducing individual labour contracts 
and introducing multi-annual contract programmes, amongst other. Nevertheless, the 
implicit rationale also plays a very important role: first the ideological background of 
the government; second and related with that, the introduction of professional 
management to reorganise some of the practices that exist within the hospitals and to 
reduce the discretion of the medical staff. 
The first reason is obviously related with the fact that the government belongs to the 
right wing, and that influences its conception of what are the best solutions for the 
current problems that exist on the hospitals. Consequently, they introduced 
management principles used in for profit organisations. According to the Minister of 
Health this instrument does not mean privatisation of the public sector. Differently, it 
means introducing in the hospitals specialised and trained managers that are aware of 
the difficulties of running complex organisations. Furthermore, there is an intention to 
reconfigure the medico-management power relations, regarding that since the creation 
of the NHS, the doctors have had a very powerful position that has created some 
difficulties to the administrations of the hospitals (further discussed when analysing 
the ‘Human Resources’). 
Once again, the political conjuncture contributes for the determination of the changes 
being introduced. It will be extremely negative if some of the reforms do not have 
continuity in the future, in case the current government does not win the forthcoming 
elections in 2006.  
 
Pharmaceutical Policy 
So far, the changes introduced in the pharmaceutical policy, had positive effects, 
considering that the public expense with medicines decreased in Portugal since 
generics were introduced. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that there is a 
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negative effect associated with the introduction of generics: when a ‘traditional’ drug 
is prescribed by the physician or bought by the patient, and a similar generic exists, 
the ‘traditional’ drug is much more expensive than it was before (mechanism 
introduced by the government in order to encourage the purchase of generics). 
Consequently, if the citizens are not sufficiently informed, they can spend money 
unnecessarily. 
It is then of maximum importance that information campaigns about the generics’ 
market are addressed to the population, in order to assure that they identify the 
options that better suit them. It also important to make the doctors aware of the 
benefits to their patients in prescribing generics instead of the ‘traditional’ drugs. 
The changes introduced in this sector are most of all related with the need to contain 
costs, therefore with the explicit rationale elements. This government reinforced the 
experiment of the generics that has already proved to be a success in other countries 
and the results have so far been positive. 
 
Human Resources 
Concerning the reforms introduced in the human resources, there are three main 
elements to be considered at this point that are interconnected: first the effects of the 
introduction of performance evaluation in the hospital companies, second the 
resistance of the personnel to change, and third the total number physicians and the 
allocation of human resources. 
The government sees the introduction of individual contracts on the hospital sector 
and the performance evaluation as a possible way to reduce the costs related with the 
salaries of the personnel. The previously described experience carried out in Hospital 
de São Sebastião, with the introduction of individual contracts based on individual 
performance was successful, and the same can happen with the 31 hospital companies 
that are now operating. It is the belief of the government that there is a greater 
incentive to be productive and efficient, when the salary depends on it. Furthermore, 
those professionals that divide their time between the private and the public sector 
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because they have a fixed salary in the public sector and want to maximize their 
income by working in the private sector, have no longer reasons to do so. As well as 
in other of the reforms already described, the motivation of this initiative of the 
government is the reduction of costs, therefore part of the explicit rationale. 
There are elements of the implicit rationale that have a very important influence over 
the changes introduced in the human resource policy: first the institutional weight that 
doctors always had in the NHS since its foundation and their consequent resistance to 
change; and second the situation in which the NHS was created, that originated a 
complicated and disorganised system translated in a deficient allocation of resources. 
As far as the first element is concerned, there is an historical dimension that is very 
important and that is one of the explanations of why the doctors have a strong power 
position within the NHS. When the NHS was created in 1979 the total number of 
doctors was very small; consequently there was a high demand for new professionals 
and during the 80’s there was a big increase in the number of doctors entering the 
NHS. As they were considered to be a very important (and scarce) resource, they were 
given a lot of power and flexibility to manage their professional life what allowed 
them, for instance, to work in the public and the private sector, being the first usually 
not a priority (as described in section 1). 
All these doctors that entered the NHS in the decade of 1980 are still working now 
and due to the number of years that they have already worked there, they occupy 
important positions within the organisations. As they have been in the NHS for a long 
time, their resistance to changes is high, especially if that change interferes directly 
with their professional situation, by the introduction of mechanisms that can menace 
the status quo and that can be perceived as a downgrade in their professional situation. 
Furthermore, usually doctors do not like if the reforms’ orientations are such that they 
intervene in patient related decisions. In this case, many doctors will quite likely 
attempt to subvert the system, perceiving it as an affront to their medical autonomy. 
Another dimension of this is that the current reforms will, in a way, alter the “power 
equilibrium” that has been historically controlled by the hospitals’ medical staff, and 
that will now shift to the hospitals’ administrators/managers. The reconfiguration of 
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the medico-management power relations is a very interesting subject that due to its 
complexity cannot be further analysed here. 
Concerning the second element, it is argued in this paper that the current problems 
identified by the government as being the result of the bad allocation of human 
resources, are related with the turbulent situation (in political, social and economical 
terms) in which the NHS was created, shortly after the Portuguese Revolution. As 
already referenced, there was not a well-delineated plan in terms of distribution of 
medical staff throughout the country what made most part of them to establish 
themselves in the coastland health facilities. Additionally, there was a lack of 
appropriate organisational and management models associated with a lack of 
transparency between the public and the private interests, which made the all the 
system even more confuse and difficult to monitor. Regarding that in the last 30 years 
not a lot has been done to correct this situation, the NHS is now facing now big 
problems in reorganising its human resources. 
Facing this situation, one of the main concerns of the government is to find a solution 
to the scarcity of human resources in the country. They proposed to develop an 
integrated information system in order to promote a better allocation of resources 
across the country. Apart from this, the government also wants to implement a 
project, together with the Ministry of Education, in order to increase the number of 
students that go each year to the medical schools. 
It is indeed a problematic situation, the one that is being created in the NHS: a 
considerable proportion of the doctors will be in the retirement age in the next 10/15 
years. But, according to data from the late 1990s (OECD, 2001a), the number of 
physicians per 1,000 population was 3.2 in Portugal, just below the EU average of 
3.3. This data raises the possibility that the problem in Portugal is more related with 
deficiencies in the distribution and allocation of resources than with its absolute 
numbers. 
The health professionals are mainly located in the urban areas around Lisbon, Oporto 
and Coimbra, while the rest of the country suffers from serious lacks of services in 
particular areas. For instance, the number of physicians in the Regional Health 
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Administration of Lisbon & Tagus Valley was in 2001, 4.1 per 1,000 population 
(much higher than the EU average) and in the Regional Health Administration of 
Alentejo it was 1.7 per 1,000 population (National Institute of Statistics, 2001). These 
asymmetries need to be corrected and that is more urgent than the increase of the 
number of students that enter a medical school, whose preferences might be to 
establish themselves in the big urban areas (because there are more opportunities, 
mainly in the private sector), thus aggravating the problem. 
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Conclusion 
 
The main objective of this article is to describe the Portuguese NHS, giving a 
particular emphasis to the reforms that are being undertaken since 2002. For this 
purpose, it starts by giving an historical account of the creation and evolution of the 
NHS and then analyses the main actions that the government implemented recently in 
order to achieve what was defined as a ‘New National Health Care System’ that will 
direct the NHS in to a “mix of heath services, where public, private and social entities 
coexist and act in an integrated manner, direct towards the needs of health care users” 
(Ministry of Finance, 2003). The analysed actions are: the Public/Private partnerships, 
the waiting lists, the hospital management reform, the pharmaceutical policy and the 
human resources policy. 
There is then a discussion about each of the reforms presented in section 2 that 
consists mainly in raising some issues that were still not addressed by the government 
and that can pose some difficulties in the implementations of the reforms and in 
achieving their goals. For this purpose, it is believed that it is necessary to understand 
what are the main motivations of the government when it decided which reforms to 
implement as well as understand what are the reasons that made the government do 
this, and not other type of changes. It is argued that there are two rationales 
underlying the options of the government: the implicit and the explicit rationale. 
Both the implicit and the explicit rationale influence heavily the attitude of the 
government. Although one approach could be to assess which of these rationales has 
more weight in the government’s t decisions, this was not the approach followed; 
what was understood to be more relevant was to comprehend that there are two 
different sets of reasons that influence the process of change that is now happening in 
the NHS. This is what is considered to be important because, if the motivations or 
reasons of the reforms are understood by the different stakeholders that are part of the 
NHS (staff of the NHS, public, politicians, etc) it is more likely that they get involved 
on them and that they face the reformation period as something necessary to the 
improvement of the heath system and not as a possible menace to their interests. For 
this, it needs to be clear what are the changes being undertaken and what are the 
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reasons to make those changes, so that all the players get involved, giving a special 
attention, at this point, to the doctors and the users of the NHS, because they are the 
ones that will feel, in a first stage, more intensively the changes introduced. 
Another important aspect that can be assured by involving the key stakeholders in the 
reforms, is giving them continuity. The best way to guarantee the continuity of the 
reforms, even if there are political changes that can menace it, is to make the people 
that are part of the NHS to move it forward. It is indeed very important that errors 
from the past are not repeated and that the driving forces of the NHS are not anymore 
dependent on the political conjuncture and the Portuguese Healthcare system starts 
finally to have a sustainable development with a strong technical base. 
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